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Structural change involving cooperative mergers,
int egrat ion into farm production and food processing,
and conglomerates signals a new set of antitrust regula-
tory issues for the food industry. But the current swell
of antitrust activity in the food industry is more complex.
It occurs at a time when there is great concern about ris-
ing food costs. The current activism of consumer groups
and proponents of stronger antitrust regulation have
brought marketing management strategies including ad-
vertising, product cycles, product and package modifica-
tion, planned obsolescence, and shelf space management
under direct antitrust scrutiny. The exemption of farm
level food prices from the economic stabilization policies
has again raised the question of a conflict between ag-
ricultural policies designed to raise producer prices
through price supports, marketing orders, and cooperative
activity, and antitrust policies designed to promote
decentralized structures and competitive prices. Pro-
ducers are, on the other hand, calling for enactment of
legislation which would give them greater equality of
bargaining power in dealing with the larger firms who
buy their products. These firms, which constitute what is
commonly referred to as agribusiness are, at the same
time, viewed by some as a direct threat to takeover of
agricultme by ownership and contractual integration, (1]
The focus of this paper shall be upon specific regu-
latory cases being litigated in the food indust~ies.
Since these cases are in litigation, this discussion
suffers from lack of finality. Yet the issues are so
pervasive with research, management, and policy impli-
cat ions that they should hardly be ignored.
The Cereal Cases: Concentration, Growth, and Market
Strategies
The cereal cases have been heralded by some as the
most important antitrust actions in the history of the anti-
trust laws. (z) In a sense they might be interpreted as an
attempt by the Federal Trade Commission to enforce the
provisions of the Concentrated Industries Act (3) before
it is enacted. In another sense they cut at the heart of
many of the marketing strategies that have become a part
of our Madison Avenue oriented marketing system.
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The ready to eat (RTE] cereal industry is composed
of six firms. The four largest firms -- Kellogg, General
Mills, General Foods, and Quaker Oats -- acc~nted for
over 90 percent of RTE cereal slaes in 1970. Since 1950
these concerns consistently accounted for over 84 percent
of sales. This high level of concentration was maintained
despite more than a fourfold expansion in the value of
cereal sold. High concentration in the cereal industry
combines high levels of advertising -- an average 13
percent of sales -- with extensive brand proliferation --
150 brands being marketed from 1950 to 1970. [4)
The charges brought under Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act in these cases are extensive.
They boil down to an alleged maintenance of high levels
of concentration of market sales in the hands of the four
largest firms by artificial and nonproductive brand pro-
liferate ion, product different iat ion, and trademark promo-
tion. A system of supermarket shelf space allocation
used by the cereal companies has also come under
scrutiny.
Two aspects of this case appear to be particularly
important for those interested in marketing and antitrust
policy, First, this is one of the first attempts to recon-
centrate an industry where high levels of concentration
were attained and maintained largely by means of internal
growth. While three acquisitions are mentioned in the
complaint, they represent what must be considered a
relatively insignificant factor in the current high level
of concentrate ion. Previous to this action, the major thrust
of the antitrust laws from a structural standpoint was the
prohibition of mergers where the effect is to substantially
lessen competition under the Clayton Act. Highly con-
centrated market structures were attacked by the Justice
Department under the Sherman Act only when there was
evidence of predatory or conspiratorial practices.
Internal growth resulting in high levels of market
concentration has not easily been reached by the Sherman
Act. The largest firm must generally have over two-thirds
of the market combined with a finding of intent to monopo-
lize, or ~here must be evidence of predatory or conspira-
torial activities among firms. This policy was recently
confirmed when the Supreme Court refused to review a
Court of Appeals decision. This decision held that the
construction of a milk processing plant by Kroger in the
St, Louis market had not violated the Sherman Act. (5)
Action under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
Journal of Food Distribution Researchmission Act was previously applied largely to anti-
competitive and deceptive practices. The cereal cases
are being used to attack a structural situation where
high levels of concentration give firms discretionary
power to engage in unfair methods of competition pro-
scribed by Section 5. In the future, such a theory could
be applied to: [1] horizontal structures where high levels
of market concentration result from either internal growth
or mergers, (2) vertical structures such as where a food
chain builds its own processing facility, or a processor
buys land for agricultural production purposes, or (3)
conglomerate structures where power relationships
among products or markets re suit.
The second important aspect of the cereal cases
involves the charges relating to high barriers to entry
created by high levels of advertising directed to a vulner-
able child audience and the FTC charge that the ...
‘Respondents artificially differentiate their RTE cereals,’
To do this the ‘Reapondenta produce basically similar
RTE cereals end then emphasize and exaggerate trivial
variations such as color and shape.’ (6) Trademarks
and premiums are then, according to the FTC, used to
conceal baaic similarities. The National Commission
of Food Marketing study of grocery manufacturing tends
to support these allegations when it found 27 new pro-
ducts were introduced between 1955 and 1964, the vast
majority of which were minor variations of existing pro-
ducts . (7)
These charges should be recognized as a direct at-
tack by the FTC on modern marketing management strat-
egies designed to take advantage of product cycles and
planned obsolescence. New product introduction combined
with high levels of advertising followed by new improved
product or package, and another dose of advertising, has
become an integral part of our marketing strategies.
Such strategies are seldom analysed in terms of the
costs they impose or replace in the marketing system.
The FTC complaint charges that the costs are high --
artificially inflated prices, high profits, lack of product
innovation, lack of meaningful competition, and blocked
entry to potential competition. (8) market strategies retort
that nonprice competition benefits consumer by increasing
sales and reducing costs, increasing variety available to
consumers, reducing the size of the needed sales force
and distribution network. They argue such benefits out-
weigh the costs aa set forth in the FTC complaint against
the benefits as set forth by market strategists. (9] If
anything, the wealth of empirical studies of the relation-
ship between structure and performance, -- even consider-
ing the large unexplained portion of variation in profits --
economic theory, and legal precedence tend to support
the FTC and place the burden of proof on the de fendent
corporations and market strategists.
If the cereal cases are successfully litigated, it goes
without saying that major changes in market management
theory and practice will be required.
Agribusiness Integration Strategies
The entrance of agribusiness into food production has
come under increasing scrutiny and criticism during the
past year, The charge is that agribusiness corporations
such as Tenneco, United Brands, Gates Rubber, Del
Monte, and Ralston Purina are converting agriculture
from a competitive industry to one dominated by conglom-
erates, In the process, these are said to be driving family
farmers off the land. The intensity of the issue is evi-
denced by the contrivers y sumounding the nomination
of the Secretary of Agriculture [10] and the introduction
in Congress of the Nelson Family Farm Act (11) which
would prohibit much of the contractual and vertical
integration existing in agriculture today, Exaggeration
of the extent of vertical integration tends to be common-
place. For example, it is estimated that only 4,5 percent
of total agricultural production is vertically integrated.
However, 1.5-17 percent of total production is produced
under product ion contract arrangements with agribusiness
firms. [121
The introduction of the Family Farm Act and similar
proposals has tended to overshadow antitrust remedies
to problems of integration. There ia currently in the FTC
1itigation a very interesting case in point. It challenges
the acquisition of at least nine small growers of lettuce
and celery by United Brands -- a 1.5 billion dollar food
industry conglomerate. Of even greater significance, it
challenges leasing, joint ventures, and full supply ar-
rangements between United and many otherwise independ-
ent producers. These arrangements give United control
of approximately 11 percent of the Nation’s lettuce pro-
duction,
Among other things, it is alleged by the FTC that
these arrangements have anticompetitive effects by
transforming the structure of the fresh lettuce, and celery
industries ‘.. from small independent profitable concerns
selling in a competitive market into an industry dominated
by large conglomerate companies selling at stable prices
arrived at outside the competitive market..,’ (13)
Two facets of this case appem to be particularly
important. First, it points up the antitrust alternative to
the Nelson Family Farm Act as a means of curtailing
integration in agriculture if such is a desired policy.
Antitrust would appear to have some advantages in this
respect, It is more flexible in that it could be applied
only in those cases where substantial anticompetitive
effects, relative to efficiency gains, are likely. And
the same standards would be applied to structural ques-
tions in agriculture as in the remainder of the economy
resulting in, among other things, fewer economic distor-
tions.
Second, the United Brands caae is more than an
ownership integration case. In fact, the proportion of
production controlled by ownership of land ia small rela-
tive to that controlled by leasing, joint venture, and full
supply arrangements. If this case is litigated success-
fully, it would, accordingly, appear to be a relatively
amal 1 step to applying the antitrust laws to agricultural
commodities where contract integration is extensive
-- broilers, turkeys, processing vegetables, and sugar
beets for example. [14)
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Producer efforts to organize bargaining activities
are currently being questioned by the Justice Department.
The 1960’s saw a major consolidation of cooperative
activity in the milk industry particularly in the Central
and Southeast United States by four major cooperatives
and two federations encompassed nearly 100,000 pro-
ducers of 34.4 billion pounds of milk, This represents
over 30 percent of the Nat ion’s milk production and
over 75 percent of the production in many Central and
Southeast United States Federal order milk markets. [15)
There are at least 14 suits pending against one or
more of these cooperatives alleging violations of the
antitrust laws since these organizations and their pre-
decessors were formed. The plaintiffs in these suits
include such parties as the Department of Justice, the’
State if Illinois, other cooperatives, handlers, and con-
sumers. All of the suits contain nearly the same basic
allegations. These allegations generally involve diverse
forms of market conduct with the alleged effect of
coercing producers who were not cooperative members
into the cooperative, foreclosing markets to noncoopera-
tive members, forcing handlers into full supply arrange-
ments, acquiring competitors, and raising prices above
competitive levehi. (16]
The allegations are pervasive in their coverage.
If successfully litigated, they have multidimensional
implications for cooperative activity. Two aspects of
the case merit comment. First the cases raise a basic
question of the extent and means by which cooperatives
can, under the Capper-Volstead Act, increase control
over the markets for which they produce. Assessment
of the appropriateness of various forms of cooperative
activity is an important aspect of answering this question.
Two basic alternatives appear to exist: (1) The coopera-
tive may be viewed as one of many participants in
competitive agricultural markets. If viewed in this
manner, the antitruat lawa and Capper-Volstead Act may
be interpreted as having the role of maintaining a compe-
titive balance between the various segments, but not
allowing the balance of market power to swing one way
or the other. (z) Producers may be viewed by some as
being in such an inferior bargaining position that coop-
erative activity, even to the extent that it achieves a
monopoly position for producers, should not be restrained.
Consistent with the latter position, the dairy coop-
erative cases bring into focus a conflict between:
(1) programs of the Department of Agriculture promoting
cooperative group action that are, in part, designed to
raise farm prices by the exercise of market power thereby
enhancing producer returns, and [2) ant itrust policies
designed to maintain a competitive market environment.
The implications for enactment of proposals, such as the
Sisk Bill, (17) which create an obligation for handlers
to bargain with qualified cooperatives, should not be
overlooked. The basic questions raised include the
appropriate limits on bargaining and the extent to which
Government supported self-help programs, as opposed
to Federal revenues and/or decisions, should be used to
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raise producer returns. In answering these questions,
clarification and recognition of a legitimate expansive
role for cooperative activity in the public and producer
interest is needed.
Second, certain questions of import to the develop-
ment of cooperative structures (18) will likely not be
answered by the current dairy cooperative cases. A
specific question involves the extent and conditions
under which cooperatives can combine with noncoopera-
tive in various types of joint ventures and bargaining
activities. The Courts have consistently held that coop-
eratives cannot maintain Capper Volstead immunity from
antitrust prosecution when they combine with noncoop-
erative firms. [19] The unanswered question is whether
a basis for distinction exists in cases where joint
ventures between cooperatives and noncooperative
re suit from a legitimate market need which has no direct
competition suppress ing effects. Another question arises
as to whether financing and profit sharing arrangements
can be worked out that are within Capper-Volstead legal
requirements. (20)
Some insight into the attitude of the Justice Depart-
ment toward these questions was provided by a recent
advisory opinion. (2I] This resulted from an application
by Holly Farms, one of the Nation’s largest broiler
contractors, to become a member of the National Broiler
Marketing Association [NBMA], a Capper-Volstead
broiler marketing cooperative.
The opinion stated that NBMA’s exempt status
under the Capper-Volstead Act may be jeopardized if
Holly Farms became a member. Justice indicated it
would consider Holly’s contract as productive nonmember’
production which cannot under the Capper-Volstead Act
exceed 50 percent of the cooperative’s volume, The
rationale Justice used was that Holly’s contracts did
not make it a producer because it did not ‘‘. . . assume
substantially all the risk typically inherent in the role of
a farmer, ” (22) Regardless of the merits of this particu-
lar rationale, a more basic question can be raised as to
whether Congress ever intended or even envisioned
agribusiness entering into contract production and form -
ing cooperative corporate combines for the purpose of
raising prices.
Issues in Supermarket Strategies and Control
The merchandising and purchasing strategies of
supermarkets also appear to be coming under increasing
scrutiny, The concerns of the regulators and consumer
activists cover a wide range of supermarket decisions - -
shelf space allocation, private label differentials, unit
pricing, open dating, grade, and nutritional labeling,
supermarket processing pricing, and procurement
strategies.
Retailer shelf space allocation policies will likely
be looked at closely in the cereal cases. The concern is
that bi-.riers to the entry of new products and food pro-
cessors may be created by supermarket shelf space
allocation procedures. Such procedures may either be
developed and operate by a supermarket chain for its
JournaJ of Food Distribution Researchstoree or by a food processor for the product line which
it manufacture s, They are generally operated on a volume
turnover basis. However, such procedures can impose
substantial barriers to the entry of mew products if
strict volume allocation procedure is used,
Barriers to entry can also be imposed by the not
particularly uncommon practice of allocating a large
proportion of the shelf to private labels, or completely
excluding brands other than the supermarket’s own label.
The interesting queetion is also posed of the obligation
of the chain to provide the consumer with a choice of
available products. If such an obligation does not exist,
if for example all chains baked their own bread, pro-
prietary firms could be excluded from a market and
consumers limited to a single brand within a store. If the
obligation doea exist, ia it an inherent obligation, or
does it only exist when there are physical or quality
differences in the products? Who determines whether
there is a quality difference?
An initially plausible alternative to allocating
shelf space on the basis of volume, is allocating it to
maximize profits. Space then becomes a function of
both volume turnover and margins. This procedure also
has pitfalls in terms of imposing barriers to entry.
Private labels frequently have wider margins than packer
labels. The private label would thus receive favored
treatment over packer labels. Packers labels could
conceivably not be allocated any shelf space if other
products could generate higher profit levels.
Logical extensions of this barrier to entry shelf
space allocation theory can be made to pricing, procure -
ment, and integration policies which have the effect of
denying particular processors shelf space or artificially
disadvantaging them in terms of price, The legal concept
and precedent to be applied may be that of a chain store
discriininating in favor of itself. (23)
The procurement strategies of chains have also
come under scrutiny as the powers of the long dormant
Section Z(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act have come to
life. The pace of FTC activity appears to be steadily
increasing [24) following the landmark Automatic Can-
teen decision holding that the Commission’s trade exper-
ience evidence could be used to show that the buyer
knowingly induced a discriminatory price within the
meaning of Section 2[fJ. (25) Thus, in the recent Kroger
case the Court of Appeals upheld an FTC decision that
Kroger knowingly induced a discriminatory price con-
cession when its milk purchasing agent gave false
competitive bid information to Beatrice. [26) The Com-
mission’s trade experience evidence included the find-
ings that the discount as large as the one ultimately
induced was unheard of in the market, was substantially
below average discounts for the market, and was not, in
fact, responsive to an actual lower offer by a competitor
in the market.
The Court of Appeals inferred injury to competition
from: (1) the substantial price advantage afforded Kroger,
(z) the fact that Kroger labeled milk was received at
cheaper prices than Beatrice labeled milk, and (3) while
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this price differential existed Kroger ‘‘. . . did not
reduce the retail price of its private label milk and,
thereby, pass on lower prices to the consumer, but
reaped higher profits for itself. [27)The Commission
inferred competitive injury since the higher profits
could be ueed by Kroger to adversely affect its com-
petitors. Pass-through of price differences might also
be required to ‘prevent multi-product margin discrimina-
tion which adversely affects the demand for high margin
products and thereby injures particular firms. In an era
of consumerism, pass-through might be required under
Section 5 of the FTC Act to prevent consumer injury.
Problems, however, result from the high degree of
regulation implied by the application of such pass-
through concepts, At the extreme is the question of
pass-through requirements for those products processed
by chains. A more likely solution to this problem is the
application of the antitrust laws to provide a sufficiently
decentralized structure to insure competitive forces to
encourage pass-through and render high margins on
particular items no more then temporary phenomena.
Implications
Ant itrust enforcement in the food industry appears
to be rising to a new level of sophistication. The prob-
lems being litigated are not purely those of structure,
conspiracy, and predatory behavior. The implications of
of this higher level of sophistication are fourfold.
(11
(21
More intensive analysis of the tacit and
consciously parallel forme of firm behavior
can be expected in the future. These are
the means by which oligopolists can alleg-
edly accomplish the same degree of market
control as monopoly and collusive oligo-
poly. In the process, many of the manage-
ment strategies that are alleged to enable
oligopolists to maintain protected markets
will be attacked,
A renewed emphasis is being placed on the
vertical market relationships by which
firms at one market level influence and
control market activity at a second level.
The emphasis will increasingly shift from
vertical acquisitions, resale price main-
tenance, and restrictions on distribution
channels to buyers who control market
access, The resurrection of the long dor-
mant Section 2(f) will result in greater
buyer responsibility in sales negotiation.
The conditions under which agribusiness
firms purchase products from producers will
be scrutinized more carefully.
As a result of these changes, research-
ers and management efforts to develop
better vertical market relationships in a
system or subsector configuration must
carefully consider the antitrust constraints
and implications of their actions end
advice. At the same time, the regulators
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must be careful to enforce their policiee in
a way that doee not unduly impede the
development of cost reducing means of
vertical coordination.
Attempts will be made to bring increaeed
rationality to apparently conflicting laws.
The linee of demarcation between the
Capper-Voletead and Sherman Act will be
brought into better focue by the cooperative
case. At the same time, preesures are
building for enactment of laws which raise
additional queetions of conflict, The pro-
posal to create obligations on the pert of
proceseore to bargain with producers, or to
exempt eoft drink bottlers from antitrust
limitations on the allocation of territorial
franchises (28] are illustrations.
More weight will likely be given to the
ultimate effect of market structure and firm
behavior upon the coneumer. The cereal
complaints charges of inflated prices, high
profits, and product imitation rather than
innovation are illuetrat ive, They do not
differ substantially from the finding that
Kroger failed to pase-through a price diff-
erence or the charges in the cooperatives
caee that coneumers have been deprived of
an opportunist y to buy milk at competitive
prices. In the offing may be a new antitrust
standard of legality which /places greater
and costs. The implications of such a de-
velopment for marketing analysts are
obvious. We have for too long drawn our
implications for performance from structure.
But there is the danger of taking too narrow
a view of the concept of consumer benefits.
Emphasis needs to be placed on the devel-
opment of a multidimensional approach to
performance, Such an approach would, in
addition to measuring the degree of mono-
polistic pricing, evaluate the contributions
of firms in dimensions such as realization
of technical efficiency, opportunities end
restrictions placed on other firms at the
same as well as other levels in the market
channel, adoption of technology, innovation
in products, variety, the quantity and
quality of information provided for decision-
making, and the responsiveness of the
induetry to changes in coneumer demand
and customer complaints. This is a big
task, Industrial organization specialists
have spent too much time counting firms
and calculating concentration ratios while
marketing specialists have been rationaliz-
ing market strategies on the grounds that
success of their uee signifies consumer
acceptance and satisfaction. While this has
been happening, public confidence in both
antitrust policy and business hae declined
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